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Appellate Review in Workmen's
Compensation and the Approaching
Demise of the Substantial Evidence Rule
By MORTON R. COLVIN*
FEW fields of legal endeavor have amassed a larger body of ap-
pellate law in California than workmen's compensation.' Thus, after
more than 50 years of experience with the Workmen's Compensation
Act,2 both bench and bar are addicted to the use of the phrase "well-
settled" when speaking of the basic principles governing that law's
application and interpretation. This springs from the fundamental de-
sire and necessity that the law be certain so that parties may know
their rights.'
In recent years, however, there have been dramatic changes in
the appellate function in workmen's compensation matters. Court-
* J.D., 1949, Hastings College of the Law; Member, California Bar; Chairman,
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
1. See Comment, Judicial Philanthropy Curbed: New Statutory Scheme for
Cumulative Injury Awards, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 156 (1968).
2. The original Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted in 1911. Cal. Stats.
1911, ch. 399, at 796. It was substantially revised in 1917 to approximate its present
form. Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of 1917, Cal. Stats. 1917,
ch. 586, at 831 (now CA. LABOR CODE §§ 3200-6149).
3. See von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARv. L.
Rlnv. 409, 410 (1924): "ETIhe rule of stare decisis is ... intended to advance the
general usefulness of the law and thus benefit the greatest number. It expedites the
work of the courts by preventing the constant reconsideration of settled questions; it en-
ables lawyers to advise their clients with a reasonable degree of certainty and safety;
it assures individuals that, in so far as they act on authoritative rules of conduct,
their contract and other rights will be protected in the courts; and, finally, it makes for
equality of treatment of all men before the law and lends stability to the judicial arm
of government." See also Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HASTiNGs L.J.
283 (1959); Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 831 (1961). But cf. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CA...
L. REv. 615 (1961).
The California Legislature has recognized the value of precedent-setting decisions
in workmen's compensation matters by provision in CAL. LABOR CODE § 115 for en
bane decisions by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, "in order to achieve
uniformity of decision, or in cases presenting novel issues." The board has frequently
used this power for the purposes indicated in section 115.
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made law has sometimes altered the very concept of industrial injury.
Some conceptual changes have been so profound as to prompt the
California Legislature to act with unprecedented dispatch in extraor-
dinary session4 "to nullify the effect upon the law of workmen's com-
pensation" of specific appellate decisions. 5
The meaning and nature of the new theories of appellate review
that have evolved and are evolving is, of course, of prime interest to
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board and to litigants who must
deal with the practical application of these theories on a daily basis.
But further than this, upon gaining an insight into the development of
the broadening appellate function, it is evident that certain valid criti-
cisms can be made, and that a reexamination of the appropriate scope
of judicial review is in order.
4. Cal. Stats. 1969 (1st Extra. Sess. 1968), ch. 4, §§ 1, 2, 10 (now CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 3208.1-.2, 5303).
5. 1968 JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, Extra. Sess. 21-22. The
pertinent portion of the legislation resulted in new CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3208.1-.2 and
an amendment to section 5303. With section 3208.1 the legislature, for the first
time, defines a "cumulative" injury and distinguishes that type of injury from a "specific"
injury. Under the new statutes a separate injury, either cumulative or specific, will
arise whenever an employee's work activity causes disability or need for medical treat-
ment. Further, when disability or need for treatment results from two or more
such separate injuries, all questions are to be separately determined with respect
to each such injury, and under the amended portion of section 5303 there can be
no merger of the separate injuries as found. This approach is directly contrary
to that taken by the court in the cases of DeLuna v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
28 Cal. App. 2d 199, 65 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1968), and Miller v. Workmen's Comp.
App. Bd., 258 Cal. App. 2d 490, 65 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1968), cited in the JOURNAL
OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, supra,, as being "nullified." See generally Comment,
Judicial Philanthropy Curbed: New Statutory Scheme for Cumulative Injury Awards,
9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 156 (1968).
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3208.1 also provides that the date of a cumulative injury as
defined "shall be the date of disability caused thereby." This is directly contrary to
the interpretation given by the California Supreme Court of the phrase "date of injury,"
as respects a cumulative injury, in the case of Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp.
App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 440 P.2d 236, 68 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1968). There the court
held that for purposes of the statute of limitations the date of a cumulative injury
was controlled by CAL. LABOR CODE § 5412. The latter section states: "The date of
injury in cases of occupational diseases is that date upon which the employee first
suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, that said disability was caused by his present or prior employment."
The last sentence of section 3208.1 thus appears to overrule the supreme court's inter-
pretation.
Because of the substantial changes in the substantive law effected by the new
legislation, the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board has recently ruled, in an en
banc decision, that the legislation should be held to operate prospectively rather than
retroactively. Gallentine v. Livingston Graham, Inc., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 326 (1969);
accord, Union Tribune Pub. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases
286 (1969).
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I. Traditional Scope of Appellate Review
Until recently, it was taken for granted that an appellate court,
in reviewing decisions of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,
should not hold a trial de novo or make an independent evaluation of
the evidence presented at trial;' the findings and conclusions of the
appeals board on questions of fact were to be final and not subject
to review.7 The oft-repeated and seemingly firmly entrenched rule
was that the findings of fact of the appeals board should not be dis-
turbed on review where supported by substantial evidence. In 1957,
the California Supreme Courts summarized the principle as follows:
When a finding of fact of the Industrial Accident Commission is
attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence
to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with
a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of
fact.
The findings of the Commission are not subject to review on
this ground except insofar as they may have been made without
any evidence whatever in their support.9
Thus, even though an appellate court, if cast in the role of fact-
finder, might have drawn a different inference from the evidence, the
court would refrain from exercising its independent judgment on the
6. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5952 provides: "The review by the court shall not be
extended further than to determine, based upon the entire record which shall be certified
by the appeal board, whether:
"(a) The appeals board acted without or in excess of its powers.
"(b) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud.
"(c) The order, decision, or award was unreasonable.
"(d) The order, decision, or award was not supported by substantial evidence.
"(e) If findings of fact are made, such findings of fact support the order,
decision, or award under review.
"Nothing in this section shall permit the court to hold a trial de novo, to take
evidence, or to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence."
7. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5953 provides: 'The findings and conclusions of the
appeals board on questions of fact are conclusive and final and are not subject to review.
Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of
the appeals board. The appeals board and each party to the action or proceeding be-
fore the appeals board shall have the right to appear in the review proceeding. Upon
the hearing, the court shall enter judgment either affirming or annulling the order,
decision, or award, or the court may remand the case for further proceedings before the
appeals board."
8. Douglas Aircraft, Inc., v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 903, 306
P.2d 425 (1957); accord, Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 49 Cal.
2d 706, 321 P.2d 460 (1958).
9. Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 903, 905, 306
P.2d 425, 426 (1957) (emphasis added).
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evidence. 10 The supreme court" restated this rule in 1961:
[W]here the evidence is in substantial conflict or is susceptible of
conflicting inferences, the finding of the [appeals board], whether
for or against the applicant, is final and it is our duty to uphold such
finding. . . . [Q]uestions as to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses are for the [appeals board] . . . if
there is any evidence, whether direct or by reasonable inference,
which will support the [appeals board's] finding .... 12
As "well-settled" as this fundamental rule of appellate review
seemed to be, the appellate courts have recently avoided adherence to
it through a misapplication of the doctrine of "liberal construction,"
derived from California Labor Code section 3202.13 This trend has
resulted in appellate courts exercising their independent judgment on
the evidence, even though that evidence is susceptible to opposing in-
ferences.
II. Present Trends
A. Lundberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
A leading example of the present trend is Lundberg v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeals Board,'4 a decision which itself may be
justified, but which seems to have been an invitation to other appellate
tribunals to ignore basic restrictions on the scope of appellate review.
In the Lundberg case, the California Supreme Court ordered the
annulment of a board decision involving a back injury wherein the
board held that the employee did not sustain an injury arising out of
and in the course of employment. On June 27, 1967, while working
as a carpenter, Lundberg developed a pain in his back. He did not
10. See Foster v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 136 Cal. App. 2d 812, 815-16, 289
P.2d 253, 254-55 (1955).
11. Keeley v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 55 Cal. 2d 261, 359 P.2d 34, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 636 (1961).
12. Id. at 265, 359 P.2d at 36, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 638, quoting Mercer-Fraser Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 102, 114, 251 P.2d 955, 961 (1953). See also
Larsen v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 34 Cal. 2d 772, 775, 215 P.2d 16, 19 (1950)
("some evidence"); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329,
339, 170 P.2d 18, 24 (1946); Pacific Lumber Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 22 Cal.
2d 410, 422-23, 139 P.2d 892, 899 (1943); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n, 19 Cal. 2d 622, 627, 122 P.2d 570, 573 (1942); Pacific Elec. Ry. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Comm'n, 96 Cal. App. 2d 651, 660, 216 P.2d 135, 150 (1950); United
States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 186, 190, 272 P.
589, 590 (1928).
13. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 provides: "The provisions of Division 4 and Di-
vision 5 of this code shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of ex-
tending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employ-
ment."
14. 69 Cal. 2d 436, 445 P.2d 300, 71 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1968).
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recall any specific accident or other incident causing the injury, al-
though he did recall that the work had been heavier than usual. The
pain continued in his back and leg until, on July 5, he left work and
consulted a doctor. He told the doctor that his back and leg condition
had developed as a result of his work, but he did not describe any
particular incident. The doctor placed him in a hospital, where it was
discovered that Lundberg had a herniated intervertebral disc, which
was removed. The doctor then filed a report of industrial injury as
required by California Labor Code section 6407. Prior to the em-
ployee's commencement of work, his back was asymptomatic except
for some problems over a brief period in 1949. He claimed that he
had fully recovered from his 1949 problems and had experienced no
further symptoms until the June 1967 incident.
The employee was examined for the insurance carrier by another
doctor who stated:
I do not know what caused the 4th lumbar intervertebral
disc to rupture. It is possible that applicant's work activity caused
the injury, but equally possible that this would have occurred had
he not been working at all.15
Dr. Portello, the employee's own doctor, merely repeated in his report
the statements made to him by the employee concerning industrial
causation. He did not say anything about the cause of the ruptured
disc.
The appeals board thus was faced with a record in which only a
speculative possibility of industrial connection was established by sci-
entific evidence. The board had previously been directed that scientific
evidence was essential to support a finding of an industrial connection
between back disability and employment, 6 and that such evidence was
required to be stated in terms of "probabilities" rather than "possibili-
ties."'" The board, in an effort to follow principles well-settled by
appellate precedent, concluded: "We are of the opinion that the appli-
15. Id. at 438, 445 P.2d at 301, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
16. Peter Kiewit Sons v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 234 Cal. App. 2d 831, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 813 (1965); City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 117
Cal. App. 2d 455, 256 P.2d 81 (1953); Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
88 Cal. App. 2d 410, 199 P.2d 12 (1948); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace.
Comm'n, 47 Cal. App. 2d 494, 118 P.2d 334 (1941).
17. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 33 Cal. 2d 684, 687, 203
P.2d 747, 748 (1949): "An award based solely upon evidence tending to prove only
a possibility of industrial causation is conjectural and cannot be sustained." See also
Owings v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 689, 692, 192 P.2d 1, 3 (1948); City
& County of San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 117 Cal. App. 2d 455, 460,
256 P.2d 81, 84 (1953).
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cant has not met his burden of proof to establish that his injury was
industrially caused."' 8
The supreme court reversed the board, stating:
The established legislative policy is that the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act must be liberally construed in the employee's favor
[Labor Code section 3202], and all reasonable doubts as to
whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in
favor of the employee. This rule is binding on the board and on
this court.
Where the evidence shows that over a period of time an em-
ployee engaged in substantial lifting work, that while engaged in
such work he developed back pain symptomatic of a ruptured disc,
and such work could cause a ruptured disc, and there is no evi-
dence of other injury or that there was a preexisting back injury,
the plain inference is that the lifting in the course of employment
resulted in a continuous cumulative traumatic injury and that the
employment was at least a contributing factor in the injury. When
there is no conflicting evidence and the inference is undisputed,
the board in furtherance of the legislative- command of liberal con-
struction in favor of the workingman must find industrial causa-
tion.19
The supreme court in Lundberg thus appeared to extend the law
by imbuing the lay opinion of the employee with the force of scientific
evidence so as to satisfy the burden of proof on the issue of industrial
causation. At least, this would seem to be one effect of the decision
in light of judicial precedents requiring scientific proof of employment
connection where disability is not obviously traceable to an employment
incident or exposure.20 In so doing, the court purported to apply
California Labor Code section 3202. On the other hand, it could
be said that the court did not exercise its independent judgment on
the evidence; rather, it accepted the facts as found by the board, but
concluded as a matter of law that under these facts, the applicant had
established a prima facie case on the issue of industrial causation.
21
18. 69 Cal. 2d at 439, 445 P.2d at 301, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
19. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
20. As observed in Peter Kiewit Sons v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 234 Cal. App.
2d 831, 44 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1965), the issue of industrial causation "may run a gamut
from the blatantly obvious to the scientifically obscure. If a painter falls to the
ground as the result of a scaffold collapse, breaking his leg, common sense dispenses
with medical evidence of causation. Other courses of disability are less available to
lay discernment ....
"Examples might be multiplied. They condense into the general proposition that
the medical cause of an ailment is usually a scientific question, requiring a judgment
based upon scientific knowledge and inaccessible to the unguided rudimentary ca-
pacities of lay arbiters." Id. at 839, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (citations omitted).
21. This approach would jibe with the court's repeated rule that where there is no
dispute in the evidence, the question of whether or not an industrial injury has
[Vol. 21
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Reasonable minds may properly differ on whether the supreme
court reached a just result in the Lundberg case. However, it is clear
that once the supreme court establishes new legal principles to reach
what it considers to be a just result in a particular case, it often starts
a chain reaction that results in further changes unrelated to the facts
or legal principles initially triggering the reaction.
B. Higel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board
This process began less than two months after the Lundberg deci-
sion when the court of appeal issued its opinion in Higel v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Board.
22
In the Higel case, the deceased employee had worked for the
Lord Menu-Printing Company for 40 years, during the last 10 of
which he was plant superintendent. In this capacity he supervised 35
to 50 employees and was responsible for all production operations.
He had no prescribed hours of work but was usually at the plant for
about 12 hours during five days of the week. He usually worked on
Saturdays and occasionally on Sundays. One Monday morning, about
occurred is one of law. Reinert v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 349, 294 P.2d
713 (1956); cf. State Comp. Ins. Fund. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 925,
434 P.2d 619, 64 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967); Greydanus v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 63.
Cal. 2d 490, 407 P.2d 296, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1965); California Cas. Indem. Exch. v.
Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 21 Cal. 2d 751, 135 P.2d 158 (1943); Western Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 517, 37 Cal. Rptr. 580
(1964); Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 93 Cal. App. 2d 244,
208 P.2d 1033 (1949). In all these cases the court accepted the findings of the
appeals board, but in applying the law to those findings in the exercise of its appellate
power, found that CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 was applicable. In none of the cases,
however, did the court direct that the trier of fact in the exercise of its factfinding
function was bound by section 3202, for example, as to the issues of the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of evidence.
The approach taken by the California Supreme Court, however, would not seem
consistent with the notion once espoused by reviewing courts that in workmen's
compensation matters the applicant has the burden of establishing his claim. In 1929,
the supreme court in Newton v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 204 Cal. 185, 267 P. 542
(1929), stated: "In the first place, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to prove
that the injury received was one which would sustain an award. 'It must be conceded
that the burden is upon the applicant for compensation to show that the injury arose
out of as well as in the course of employment; and that there is no presumption, as
contended by respondents, that because an injury occurs in the course of employment
it arises out of or because of that employment."' Id. at 188, 267 P. at 543 (citations
omitted); accord, Associated Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Conm'n, 120 Cal. App. 2d
423, 426, 261 P.2d 25, 27 (1953); O'Hare v. Industrial Ace. Conm'n, 44 Cal. App.
2d 629, 112 P.2d 918 (1941); see Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
21 Cal. 2d 742, 744, 135 P.2d 153, 154 (1943).
22. 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 753 (Ct. App. 1968), petition for hearing denied,
70 A.C., No. 5, Minutes, at 4 (Jan. 22, 1969).
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11 A.M., while sitting at his desk at work, Higel suddenly slumped
over; he died shortly thereafter. The autopsy report and the certificate
of death ascribed the employee's death to acute coronary thrombosis
due to artherosclerotic heart disease.
During the course of proceedings instituted by the widow for
workmen's compensation death benefits, a conflict of medical opinion
developed concerning the cause of the decedent's condition. One doc-
tor reported on the basis of information supplied by the widow's attor-
ney that it was his firm opinion that the decedent's work was at least
contributory to, and may have been wholly responsible for, his fatal
heart attack. On the other hand, defendant's doctor, Dr. Allenstein,
who had reviewed the deposition of the employer's general manager, the
testimony concerning the stressful work conditions, and the decedent's
medical record, evaluated the combined effect of the various work con-
ditions on the decedent's temperament. He concluded:
I do not believe that we can show any causality in the death of
Mr. Higel which is related to his employment. The amount of
physical labor which he performed was mild to moderate, occa-
sionally lifting loads approximately 50 to 60 pounds . . . . The
work that Mr. Higel performed was not in excess of the usual
work he had been performing for years.
The role of mental stress as a related agent in the causation
of myocardial infarctions has been debated and is rather ill defined.
What is mental stress to one individual may be unnoticed by an-
other . . . . An occupation that causes mental stress related to
myocardial infarction is exemplified by accountants at tax report
time. Here there is concentration over prolonged hours of contin-
ued mental pressures of intensified degree. This type of pressure
did not apply to Mr. Higel. Although he apparently spent long
hours at his work, he loved his work; this, his wife asserted .... 23
When cross-examined on this report, Dr. Allenstein testified that
the decedent was more prone to develop coronary disease. He stated:
He was a stressed individual. . . . who had a drive, a com-
pulsion; therefore he was a more prone individual to develop
coronary artery disease [even] if he had nothing to do, regardless of
his employment . . . . The whole field of emotional stress is
highly controversial and uncertain, and it is undoubtedly the least
substantiated factor in the causation [of heart diseases]. 24
After weighing the evidence, the trial referee found the case to be
compensable. On reconsideration, however, the appeals board reversed
this determination and concluded that on the basis of the testimony
23. Quoted directly from the medical report of Dr. Bertran J. Allenstein, dated
Oct. 7, 1967, referred to by the court in 33 Cal. Comp. Cases at 755-56.
24. Quoted from Transcript of Proceedings of Nov. 22, 1967, Higel v. Work-
men's Comp. App. Board, 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 753 (Ct. App. 1968).
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given by defendant's doctor, the heart condition did not arise out of or
in the course of employment.2 5
The court of appeal, in reversing the board, discussed the reports
and testimony of the two doctors and then stated:
Under the legislative mandate of liberal construction in favor
of compensability found in Labor Code section 3202, all reasonable
doubts, as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to
be resolved in favor of compensability of the injury. [Citation to
Lundberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board].26
Commenting upon the opinions expressed by Dr. Allenstein, the
court concluded that his opinion was "patently both absurd and in-
credible and also at variance with the doctor's own testimony that emo-
tional stress is the reaction of some individuals to their jobs. ' 7  The
court then noted:
Nevertheless, we are bound to affirm the board's order an-
nulling death benefits in this case if those findings are supported
by substantial evidence. . . . Their only support, however, lies in
the statements and conclusions of Dr. Allenstein, to which we have
already alluded. Substantial evidence is evidence that reasonably
inspires confidence and is of "solid value.
'28
The manner in which the court reached its conclusion that the doc-
tor's medical opinion was of no substantive weight is noteworthy. At
first, the court acknowledged that the board complied with the re-
quirements of Labor Code section 5908.5 by setting forth the evidence
relied upon and specifying in detail the reasons for its decision.2 9 The
25. Higel v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 753, 755 (Ct.
App. 1968).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 757.
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. See Evans v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 753, 441 P.2d 633, 68
Cal. Rptr. 825 (1968). In Evans, the supreme court held that it would require the
appeals board to strictly comply with CAL. LABOR CODE § 5908.5, which provides
that the appeals board shall "state the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the
reasons for the decision." Unfortunately, some reviewing courts have used the rule of
the Evans case as a means to reweigh evidence and to reach an independent judgment
on the evidence contrary to the specific prohibitions against such practices under CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 5952-53. See notes 6 & 7 supra. The process operates when the courts
disagree with the reasons specified by the board for the board's conclusions, and
hold in reevaluating the evidence that the board's reasons are insufficient as a matter
of law, requiring annulment of the board's decision.
A striking example of this process occurred in Lund v. Workmen's Comp. App.
Bd., 34 Cal. Comp. Cases 227 (Ct. App. 1969), wherein the board had found that
the employee's injury to his back caused a period of temporary disability but no
permanent disability. The board relied on the report of a Dr. Adams, who concluded
as follows: "Based on our present examination and the available medical information
we find no permanent disability that could be attributed to his work efforts of November
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court did not conclude, nor was any contention made, that Dr. Allen-
stein was not an expert in the field of cardiology,30 that he had ex-
pressed a legal conclusion rather than a medical opinion, 3 that he had
relied on an erroneous record,3 2 or that he did not consider all the ma-
terial components of the record in rendering his opinion.33 Nevertheless,
the court did conclude that his opinion failed to meet the test of "sub-
7, 1967, which were merely a temporary aggravating factor from which he has re-
covered.
"In the interest of terminating the case we would allow a temporary period of
disability of six to eight weeks to recover from the temporary aggravation resulting
from his work efforts." Id. at 229. The court rejected the board's contention that Dr.
Adams' report should be read in its entirety so as to resolve the conflict in the evidence
in favor of the board's finding, reweighed Dr. Adams' opinion and held that the opinion
did not constitute substantial evidence in light of the fact that the employee had
worked for over 20 months prior to his injury doing heavy work without incident.
The court observed that this latter fact would be difficult to reconcile with the doc-
tor's conclusion that petitioner's disability was not attributable to the November 1967
injury. Id. at 230-31.
The court, in rejecting Dr. Adams' opinion in favor of two other reporting phy-
sicians, overlooked that portion of section 4660 of the Labor Code which defines
permanent disability as a "diminished ability to compete in an open labor market."
CAL. LABOR CODE § 4660(a). Dr. Adams' report, taken by its four comers, con-
eluded simply that Lund, prior to the incident of November 1967, was an individual
with a handicap, consisting of back disability, who should not perform strenuous
physical activity. This, then, was a preexisting permanent disability, the existence of
which was confirmed by the fact that the performance of such strenuous physical
activity in November, 1967, produced severe temporary symptoms. In Dr. Adams'
opinion, however, after the temporary aggravative symptoms had subsided, the em-
ployee's condition reverted to that which had preexisted the November 1967 incident;
that is, the handicap precluded the employee from engaging in strenuous physical
activity.
Other courts also seem to be employing the same device of reweighing the evidence
in order to reach an independent judgment in conflict with the factual findings of the
board. See Cal-Nat Airways, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 268 Cal. App. 2d 93,
73 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1968); Peck v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 267 Cal. 2d 448, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1968); B.L. Ranch, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 266 Cal. App. 2d
192, 73 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1968); Holcomb v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 266 Cal App.
2d 108, 71 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1968); Brady v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 34 Cal. Comp.
Cases 41 (Ct. App. 1969).
30. Compare Peter Kiewit Sons v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 234 Cal. App. 2d
831, 44 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1965); Pacific Employers Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 47
Cal. App. 2d 494, 118 P.2d 334 (1941); Simpson Constr. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
74 Cal. App. 2d 239, 240 P. 58 (1925).
31. Compare Zemke v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 794, 441 P.2d
928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1968).
32. Compare Blankenfeld v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 36 Cal. App. 2d 690, 98
P.2d 584 (1940); Mark v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 29 Cal. App. 2d 495, 500, 84
P.2d 1071, 1074 (1938); Gamberg v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 424
427, 32 P.2d 413, 415 (1934).
33. Compare Winthrop v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 213 Cal. 351, 2 P.2d 142
(1931).
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stantial evidence."38
The court in Higel thus applied the rule of the Lundberg case to a
factual situation that bore no relationship to Lundberg. In Lundberg,
the record contained "no conflicting evidence" and the inference of in-
dustrial causation was undisputed;' 5 whereas in Higel there was a clear
conflict in the medical record. The apparent reason for the illogic of
the Higel case is a misapplication of section 3202. The section contains
a legislative mandate, addressed to the courts, to liberally interpret
workmen's compensation laws, "with the purpose of extending their
benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their em-
ployment.
'"3 6
The scope of appellate court review is limited to questions of
law.87 Section 3202, by its express language, does not and cannot
extend to the manner in which factual issues are resolved. The fact-
finding function is exclusively the province of the appeals board.- 8
The court in Lundberg applied section 3202 to the undisputed facts as
found by the board and concluded that as a matter of law those facts
established industrial causation. 39 In Higel, on the other hand, the
court disagreed with the board's finding that the decedent's work ac-
tivity did not contribute to his death.40 By citing Lundberg as au-
thority, the Higel court read into section 3202 the requirement that the
board must liberally resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of com-
pensability when a "reasonable doubt" about compensability exists.
41
In applying the rule in Lundberg, the court overlooked the fact that the
supreme court specifically noted that it was not reweighing the evi-
dence but accepting the facts as found by the board. The supreme
court in Lundberg limited its application of section 3202 by stating:
When there is no conflicting evidence and the inference is un-
disputed, the board in furtherance of the legislative command of
liberal construction in favor of the workingman must find indus-
trial causation.
42
The medical record in the Higel case, including the reports and
34. Higel v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 753, 757 (CL
App. 1968).
35. 69 Cal, 2d at 439, 445 P.2d at 302, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
36. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202; see note 13 supra.
37. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5952-53; see notes 6 & 7 supra and cases cited in text
accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
38. See cases cited note 12 supra & accompanying text.
39. 69 Cal. 2d at 439, 445 P.2d at 302, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
40. 33 Cal. Comp. Cases at 757.
41. Id. at 756.
42. 69 Cal. 2d at 439, 445 P.2d at 302, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
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testimony of the doctors for both parties presented what would seem
to be a common example of conflicting evidence, quite typical of records
before the appeals board.43 The inference of industrial causation was
anything but undisputed. The only manner in which the Higel court
could reach such a conclusion was to characterize the opinion of defend-
ant's doctor as not constituting "substantial evidence."
While the meaning of the term "substantial evidence" has not
been specifically defined in a workmen's compensation case, the term
as applied to appellate review generally has been defined as
evidence "which, if true, has probative force on the issues." It is
more than "a mere scintilla," and the term means "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." 44
It is difficult to discern any reason why this definition should not apply
in workmen's compensation matters. Although Labor Code section
5952 provides that appellate review "be based on the entire record,"
the section cannot mean that an appellate court is authorized to re-
evaluate the whole record. Rather, the appellate function should be to
look to the record to ascertain whether there exists substantial evidence
to support the finding in question. The rule has been held to be that
the appellate courts will review the entire record for supporting evi-
dence, but that conflicting evidence will be ignored. 4-
In ignoring this rule, the court in the Higel case exercised its own
judgment on the evidence and selected that portion of the evidence it
found most persuasive. By doing this and rejecting the report and
testimony of defendant's doctor as "insubstantial evidence," the court
reached the conclusion that as a matter of law, long hours of enjoyable
work by an employee who was more prone to develop coronary artery
disease if he had nothing to do will contribute to the occurrence of a
myocardial infarction. Such a holding is difficult to defend, either
empirically or on the basis of long established authority. Unfortu-
nately, the approach taken on appellate review in the Higel case is
becoming increasingly and alarmingly more familiar.46
43. E.g., Foster v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 136 Cal. App. 2d 812, 289 P.2d 253
(1955).
44. Estate of Teed, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644, 247 P.2d 54, 58 (1952), citing
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See also Dyer v. Knue,
186 Cal. App. 2d 348, 8 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1960), 1 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF
EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 10.08 t1]-[3] (2d ed. 1968).
45. See, e.g., Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 49 Cal. 2d 706,
321 P.2d 460 (1958).
46. See discussion in note 29 supra.
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III. Conclusion
It would be folly to look upon the workmen's compensation law
as a sterile field. Accommodation must always be made for change;
the law is a living body and from time to time must adjust to its
changing environment. But where change does occur, as it did in
Lundberg, it is vital that the courts understand the true nature of that
change. Misapplication of a rule of law results not in adjustment to a
changing environment, but in a change of the environment itself.
The misapplication of the Lundberg holding by the Higel court
could well lead to a material alteration of the traditional function of
appellate review, with a concomitant emasculation of the factfinding
powers of the judicial tribunal charged with adjudication of workmen's
compensation cases. To avoid this result and to restore a proper separ-
ation of the factfinding function and appellate review, the legislative
mandate contained in section 3202 for liberal construction of the law
must be carefully distinguished from the legislative command contained
in sections 5952 and 5953 delimiting the boundaries of appellate re-
view. Otherwise the appellate court would improperly become the
trier of fact. Hearings before the board would then be almost super-
fluous, especially if all conflicts in evidence had to be resolved in favor
of compensability, as they would under the Higel application of section
3202. Determination of facts by the appellate court would effectively
repeal sections 5952 and 5953.
If "substantial evidence" means, as indicated in Higel, that evi-
dence supportive of a finding of fact must be something more than
competent legal evidence and must somehow inspire the members of the
appellate bench in accordance with their own views respecting the
factual issue to be decided, then we have reached a judicial abrogation
of the clear legislative intent that board findings on issues of fact are
conclusive. It may be well to ponder Justice Burke's remarks in a
dissenting opinion in a recent case:
[T]he majority opinion has reweighed the evidence, attempt-
ing to reconcile the testimony which conflicts with the "conclu-
sion" it announces, and has usurped the role of fact-finder con-
trary to fundamental rules governing the functions of this court.
47
Whether the test of "substantial evidence" as applied in Higel will
find permanent acceptance, or will ultimately be rejected as a judicial
misadventure, remains to be seen. The answer will in large measure
turn on whether courts will reexamine the meaning and intent of Cali-
47. Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 814, 826, 447 P.2d 365, 373,
73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 261 (1968).
February 19701 APPELLATE REVIEW
660 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
fornia Labor Code section 3202 and confine its application to questions
of law, thus leaving to the appeals board the function of determining
findings and conclusions on questions of fact, despite the court's own
inclination to draw inferences from the evidence varying from those
drawn by the appeals board. If the essence of judicial statesmanship
is judicial restraint, the scope of appellate review will become settled
and will not vary according to the facts in particular cases. Perhaps
it is time to hearken to the words of Judge Learned Hand: "[I]t is
more important that the law should be certain than that ideal justice
should be done ....
48. Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., 291 F. 922, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921), where the eminent
jurist states that a judge should "draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He
is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life."'
